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Abstract
In the standard independent private values (IPV) model, each bidder’s beliefs about the values
of any other bidder is represented by a unique prior. In this paper we relax this assumption
and study the question of auction design in an IPV setting characterized by ambiguity: bidders
have an imprecise knowledge of the distribution of values of others, and are faced with a set
of priors. We also assume that their preferences exhibit ambiguity aversion. We show that a
simple variation of a discrete Dutch auction can extract almost all surplus. This contrasts with
optimal auctions under IPVwithout ambiguity as well as with optimal static auctions with am-
biguity - in all of these, types other than the lowest participating type obtain a positive surplus.
And, unlike the well-known Cremer-McLean mechanism, our modified Dutch mechanism sat-
isfies limited liability. An important point of departure is that the modified Dutch mechanism
we consider is dynamic rather than static, establishing that under ambiguity aversion–even
when the setting is IPV in all other respects–a dynamic mechanism could have additional bite
over its static counterparts.
KEYWORDS: Ambiguity Aversion, Modified Dutch Auction, Surplus Extraction
JEL CLASSIFICATION: D44
1We thank Sujoy Mukerji for very useful comments.
1 Introduction
In the standard independent private values (IPV) setting bidders draw privately known
valuations from a given distribution. Each bidder is assumed to maximize subjective
expected utility, so that each bidder’s beliefs about the values of any other bidder is
represented by a unique prior (i.e. a unique distribution over the domain of values). In
this setting Dutch auctions coincide with First Price Sealed Bid auctions,(2) and optimal
auctions leave all but the lowest participating type with a surplus. This is true whether
bidders are risk neutral or risk averse.(3)
In this paper we relax the unique prior assumption and study the question of auction
design in an IPV setting characterized by ambiguity: bidders have an imprecise knowl-
edge of the distribution of values of others, and are faced with a set of priors. We also
assume that their preferences exhibit ambiguity aversion.
Previous work by Bose, Ozdenoren, and Pape (2006) has shown that in the setting of
ambiguity that we consider, the optimal static mechanism also leaves buyer types with
information rent (the amount of rent varies with the extent of the ambiguity). In con-
trast, our main result shows that in this setting of ambiguity averse buyers, the seller
can use a simple variation of a discrete Dutch auction and extract almost all surplus.
The important point of departure is that the modified Dutch mechanism we consider
is dynamic rather than static, establishing that a dynamic mechanism can present the
seller with additional surplus extraction opportunities under ambiguity aversion even
in a setting that is captured by the IPV model in all other respects.
In a seminal paper, Ellsberg (1961) showed that lack of knowledge about the distribu-
tion over states, often referred to as ambiguity, can affect the choice of a decision maker
in a fundamental way that cannot be captured by a framework that assumes a unique
prior. Several subsequent studies have underlined the importance of ambiguity aver-
sion in understanding decision making behavior,(4) and models taking such aversion
(2)As far as we are aware, Karni (1988) is the first to show that the equivalence between Dutch and
First Price Sealed Bid auctions breaks down under non-expected utility preferences.
(3)Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981) analyze optimal auctions with risk neutral bidders.
Under risk neutrality, all standard auctions are optimal given an appropriate choice of reserve price.
Matthews (1983) andMaskin and Riley (1984) characterize the optimal auction with risk averse bidders.
The optimal auction in this case is quite complex, involving payments by some losing bidders.
(4)See, for example, Camerer and Weber (1992).
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into account have provided important insights in a variety of economic applications
including auctions.(5)
We model ambiguity aversion using the maxmin expected utility (MMEU) model of
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). The MMEU model is a generalization of the subjective
expected utility model, and provides a natural and tractable framework to study am-
biguity aversion. In MMEU agents have a set of priors (instead of a single prior) on the
underlying state space, and the payoff from any action is the minimum expected utility
over the set of priors. In our setting, each buyer considers a set of distributions that
contain the distribution from which the other buyer’s valuation is drawn and each ac-
tion (from the mechanism proposed by the seller) is evaluated based on the minimum
expected utility over the set of distributions. The buyer then chooses the best action
from the set of actions. To make the sharpest contrast with the standard model, we
assume that the seller is ambiguity neutral and both the buyers and the seller are risk
neutral. In other words, apart from relaxing the unique prior assumption, our frame-
work is as close to the standard IPV model as possible.(6)
In this paper we use a version of MMEU known as “epsilon-contamination.”(7) The
model we consider has a seller whose valuation of the object is (normalized to) zero.
There are two potential buyers and the seller does not know either buyer’s valuation
but believes that the valuations are determined based on independent draws from the
distribution F(v) having support [0, 1]. Each buyer knows his own valuation but has
ambiguity regarding the valuation of the other buyer. We model this by using the
epsilon-contamination model. Intuitively, for some ε > 0, the buyer puts 1− ε weight
(5)For example, using such preferences Mukerji (1998) explains the incompleteness of contracts and
Mukerji and Tallon (2004) explain the puzzling absence of wage indexation. An application to auction
theory is developed by Lo (1998), who shows that if bidders are ambiguity averse, the revenue equiva-
lence theorem (which holds in the standard IPV setting) is violated - sealed bid first price auctions raise
more revenue than sealed bid second price auctions.
(6)With multiple priors, the terms “independent” and “correlated” need to be used carefully. For the
most part we avoid using these terms. The important point is that in the standardmodel, evenwith risk-
neutrality, full surplus extraction is not possible when the beliefs do not depend on one’s own valuation
(i.e., in the independent case). Hence it is worth emphasizing that we consider the case where the sets
of probability distributions are the same for every buyer and do not depend on a buyer’s own valuations.
As shown by Bose et al. (2006), the optimal static mechanism does not extract full surplus in this setting.
(7)An interesting paper by Kopylov (2007) shows that this specification can be obtained by adding an
axiom requiring affinity for ambiguity hedging to those proposed by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) for
axiomatizing the MMEU representation. See also Nishimura and Ozaki (2006).
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that the other buyer’s valuation is drawn from the distribution F, but puts ε weight
that the valuation could be drawn from some other distribution. Formally, letting P
denote the set of all distributions on [0, 1] and PB the set that represents the set from
which a buyer thinks the other buyer’s valuation is drawn, a distribution G(v) is in PB
if
G(v) = (1− ε)F(v) + εL(v)
for some distribution L belonging to P and ε ∈ (0, 1]. This specification–known in
the literature as epsilon contamination–is in widespread use for its intuitive qualities
and analytical tractability.(8) The parameter ε captures the extent of the ambiguity; the
buyer puts a weight ε on the possibility that the distribution could be something other
than F(v).(9)
Let us now describe our Modified Dutch Mechanism (MDM). The seller declares a
decreasing sequence of prices {p1, .., pn} at the beginning. In stage t, provided the item
has not been sold up to that point, the seller randomly approaches a buyer and offers
the item at price pt. This offer is secret in the sense that the other buyer is not made
aware of this. If the approached buyer passes, the seller approaches the other buyer
(also in secret) and offers the item at the same price pt. If the second buyer refuses as
well then the game goes to stage t + 1. If both buyers refuse at stage n, the seller keeps
the item.
Since the seller approaches the buyers in secret, they do not know whether they are in
first or second place in that period. We assume that the seller approaches the buyer at
random each period and the randomization is independent across periods. This, along
with the fact that the buyers do not know their own place in the que, helps keep the
mechanism symmetric.(10)
The crucial feature of the mechanism is that in each period if a buyer is approached
he has the opportunity to buy the item with certainty, and therefore get an ex post
surplus of v− pt for sure, or to wait, and face the outcome of some lottery. This feature
(8)The specification is used extensively in the literature on robust statistics, starting with (as far as
we are aware) Huber (1973). Examples from the economics literature include Chen and Epstein (2002),
Chu and Liu (2002), Mukerji (1998), Nishimura and Ozaki (2004).
(9)Epsilon contamination is used for all the results below. However, F being focal is inessential; any
other distribution in place of F to generate the set PB would suffice just as well. We use the same F to
represent the seller’s beliefs as well as to generate PB to save on notation.
(10)Note that the seller commits to a price sequence. Hence what is (random and) secret in each period
is the order in which the seller approaches the buyers, and not the price that is offered.
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is important in extracting surplus from buyers.
Our surplus extraction result states the following. Fix a preference parameter ε >
0. There is a δ∗(ε) such that for any given δ < δ∗(ε) and any η > 0, the seller can
construct an MDM (i.e., choose a price sequence pn) such that the mass of buyer types
who do not buy is at most [0, η] (i.e. the reserve type is at most η), and the types
who buy do so at a price such that their ex post surplus is at most δ. Since both δ
and η can be arbitrarily small, the seller can therefore extract almost full surplus. The
crucial element is the construction of the price sequence. In any period t, provided
the item has not been sold already, a buyer type v who has been offered the item can
purchase and ensure a surplus v − pt Suppose v − pt > 0. Consider the alternative
strategy where the buyer plans to buy the item at price pt+1 in the next period if it is
still available. Because the buyer considers the worst conditional distribution while
calculating the benefit and cost of purchasing versus waiting, epsilon contamination
preference implies that the resulting equilibrium when the price sequence has been
chosen appropriately makes every type buy at a price which is not more than δ below
its true valuation. Put differently, even though gain from buying is only δ, gain from
waiting is made still smaller so that the buyer buys at the “right” price and obtains a
surplus of at most δ.
As noted earlier, in the standard unique prior IPV model, the optimal auction does
not extract full surplus. Using a discrete type space, Cre´mer and McLean (1988) show
that if types are correlated, under certain conditions full surplus can be extracted.(11)
Following this result, McAfee and Reny (1992) show that when the type space is a con-
tinuum, full surplus cannot be extracted if beliefs are independent of valuations but
when beliefs do depend on valuation, a lottery (random participation fee) can be used
in conjunction to standard auctions to extract almost full surplus.(12),(13)
Our mechanism does not require any such extraneous lotteries, and considers valua-
tions independent of beliefs, the case in which full surplus extraction is not possible
in the standard subjective expected utility framework. Further, unlike the Cremer-
(11)Cre´mer and McLean (1985) provide conditions under a finite state space for a price discriminating
monopolist to extract full surplus.
(12)The result requires a condition that ensures that the beliefs have enough variation (usually referred
to as the “full rank” or “convex hull” conditions).
(13)See also McAfee et al. (1989) for surplus extraction results in the special case of common value auc-
tions.
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McLean mechanism, our mechanism–which is a variation of the Dutch auction–also
satisfies limited liability.(14)
Several papers have studied auctions (or auction-like environments) when bidders
have non-expected utility preferences (e.g. Karni and Safra 1986, 1989a,1989b; Karni 1988;
Lo 1998; Nakajima 2004; Ozdenoren 2002; Volij 2002). The closest intellectual antecedents
appear in the paper by Bose et al. (2006), who study optimal auction design for the
same environment that we consider in this paper. They use the revelation principle
and study essentially static mechanisms, and show that in the epsilon contamination
case, the optimal static mechanism leaves types with information rents which approach
those found in the unique prior case as ε → 0. Thus the correspondence mapping ε to
the optimal (static) mechanism is upper semi continuous (though not lower semi con-
tinuous). Our results show that the upper semi continuity result depends crucially on
the mechanism being a static mechanism. Our dynamic mechanism extracts almost
all rents for arbitrarily small ε - and is thus discontinuously different from the unique
prior case.
Earlier work in the area of robust Bayesian statistics have studied dynamic inference
problems facing a decision maker with maxmin preferences. The literature shows that
the juxtaposition of maxmin preferences with full Bayesian updating can give rise to
surprising results.(15) However, as far as we are aware, this paper is the first to study
the question of dynamic mechanism design under such non-EU preferences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model.
Section 3 presents our mechanism, and characterizes equilibria in the induced game.
The main (surplus extraction) result of the paper appears in section 4, and section 5
presents a numerical example. Section 6 discusses some aspects of the model, and
section 7 concludes.
(14)Robert (1991) shows that the Cremer-McLean result relies crucially on risk neutrality as well as
limited liability. While we do not explicitly consider risk-aversion, it is easy to show that our basic result
is unchanged if bidders are risk averse.
(15)See, for example, Augustin (2003), Grunwald and Halpern (2004), Seidenfeld (2004).
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2 The Model
There is a seller with one indivisible object for sale. The seller’s valuation of the item is
(normalized to) zero. There are two potential buyers with valuations of the object lying
in the interval [0, 1].(16), (17) Own valuation is private information of each buyer. Each
buyer believes that the other’s valuation is drawn from some distribution from a set
of distributions on [0, 1]. The preferences of the buyers is represented by the maxmin
expected utility (MMEU, henceforth) model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Briefly,
if Ω is a set, P is a set of distributions on Ω, and F is a set of acts from Ω to the real
line R, then an act f ∈ F is evaluated according to the rule
min
p∈P
∫
u( f )dp
where u is some real valued function. In our context, we assume buyers are risk-
neutral.
The seller is (risk and) ambiguity neutral and has a prior over a buyer’s valuation given
by the distribution F(v) with a continuous density f (v) > 0. Wemodel the set of priors
representing buyer’s ambiguous beliefs using the epsilon contamination model. Let P
denote the set of all distributions on [0, 1]. The set of distributions, PB, representing
the buyers’ beliefs, is given by the following: G(·) ∈ PB if for any v ∈ [0, 1], G(v) ≡
(1− ε)F(v) + εL(v) for some L(·) ∈ P .(18) Note that other than non-unique priors, the
rest of the model conforms as closely as possible to the IPV model standard in auction
theory.
The Gilboa-Schmeidler model is atemporal. Since our mechanism is dynamic, we need
to extend the basic model to suit the specific context of our dynamic mechanism. We
discuss this in section 3.2 after specifying the mechanism.
(16)We could, for the sake of generality, represent the buyer’s possible valuations to be the set [v, v].
However, we do allow the seller to have a non-trivial reserve price, and, as the result below shows, the
normalization to the space [0, 1] is harmless, and reduces algebraic clutter.
(17)Generalization to arbitrary N > 2 buyers is straightforward.
(18)Use of F to generate both the seller’s beliefs as well as the set PB representing the buyers’ beliefs is
not essential. See footnote (9).
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3 The Modified Dutch Mechanism
We now describe the Modified Dutch Mechanism (MDM). The mechanism works as
follows. At the beginning, the seller declares a price sequence {p1, p2, ...pn} where pt
is the asking price in period t. In period t = 1, the seller randomly chooses a buyer to
approach first and offers the object at price p1. If the buyer buys at that price the game
is over; otherwise the seller approaches the other buyer and offers the same price p1.
Again, if the second buyer accepts, the game is over; otherwise we go to period 2. The
game continues in this manner: provided the item remains unsold after period t − 1,
in period t the seller again randomly chooses a buyer to approach first and offers the
item at price pt. If this buyer refuses, the seller offers the item to the other buyer at (the
same) price pt. If the item is unsold at the end of period n, the seller keeps the item.
Note that the seller randomly chooses the order of approaching the buyers each period
and this randomization is independent across periods. Also, an important feature of
the mechanism is that the buyers themselves do not know the outcome of the seller’s
randomization and therefore they do not know their own place in the que.(19) This
keeps the mechanism symmetric.
The mechanism is a modification of a discrete price Dutch auction; in particular we
assume–as is standard in dynamic auctions–that there is no discounting between pe-
riods. The seller’s ex post payoff is the price at which the item is sold if it is sold and
zero otherwise. The ex post payoff of a buyer of type v is v− p if it obtains the item at
price p and is zero otherwise.
We maintain the standard assumption of mechanism design literature that the seller,
the mechanism designer in our context, can commit to the mechanism. In particular this
means that the price sequence declared at the beginning of the game and the random
procedure of approaching buyers every period is adhered to as the game progresses.
Put differently, once a mechanism is chosen, only the two buyers - and not the seller
- are the players in the game induced by the mechanism. We also make the standard
assumption that all of the above is common knowledge.
(19)In any period when the item is offered to a buyer, he knows that this could be because he is the first
in the que for that period, or it could be because the seller had first approached the other buyer who
passed on the offer.
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3.1 The Price Sequence
Wenowdescribe the price sequence associatedwith theMDM. For δ > 0, let {p0, p1, ..., pn}
be the price sequence where
p0 = 1 and
pk =
(1− δ)k
(1− δ + εδ)k−1
for any k > 0 (3.1)
We remind the reader that ε is a preference parameter; the role of δ will become clear
shortly. Note that pk is a decreasing sequence. Let ∆k denote the “price gap” pk − pk+1,
where
p0 − p1 ≡ ∆0 = δ, and
pk − pk+1 ≡ ∆k =
(1− δ)kδε
(1− δ + εδ)k
for any k > 0 (3.2)
Note that ∆k is also decreasing in k. It also follows directly that
lim
n→∞
n∑
k=0
∆k = 1
Since in the limit the prices cover the entire unit interval, we have the following prop-
erty, which is important for later results:
Property: Given any η ∈ (0, 1), there exists an integer T such that
∑T
k=1 ∆k > 1− η.
Given any η ∈ (0, 1), let T∗ be the smallest integer for which the above inequality is
satisfied. We set n = T∗, which defines the last offered price pn.
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3.2 Strategies and equilibria
As explained above, MDM results in a sequential (extensive form) game of incomplete
information. A strategy of a type in this game is a plan to accept or reject the seller’s
offer at every information set (i.e. at every instance where the seller makes the offer)
given the history of the game so far. An equilibrium is a pair of strategies, one for each
buyer, satisfying the standard conditions: the pair is commonly known and each is a
best response with respect to the other. Further restrictions on the structure of behavior
of buyers are discussed below.
First, we make the standard assumption that the game itself is common knowledge.
Each buyer faces ambiguity about the type of the other buyer, but, as in the standard
models, knows how each type behaves in equilibrium.(20)
Second, the buyers have maxmin preferences throughout the game. In other words,
at every stage, they behave by choosing actions to maximize the minimum expected
payoff from a set of (updated) distributions. Note that both buyers start with the same
set of priors and use the same updating rule every period.
Third, the dynamic behavior of the buyers is sophisticated. They form their decisions
based on the entire game tree, and correctly anticipate their own behavior at future
dates. Recently, Siniscalchi (2006) has provided an axiomatic foundation of such so-
phisticated dynamic choice for ambiguity-sensitive decision makers. We follow the
same idea here and posit that the (conditional) preferences are defined over trees,
rather than acts; we comment more on this in section 6 below.(21) The equilibrium
strategy of a buyer is perfect in the sense that just like in the standard case, the same
consistency requirement is imposed on the off-the-equilibrium-path information sets
as well. A type’s equilibrium decision in any period (i.e. to accept or to reject the
(20)Previous research has studied static mechanisms in exactly this context. Our objective is to have
a dynamic mechanism while preserving other aspects of the framework. Note that we are ruling out
strategic ambiguity: players do not doubt each other’s rationality. Of course, the scenario where a
player has ambiguous beliefs not only about the other player’s valuation but also about what the other
player might do is potentially interesting. However, since presence of ambiguity regarding the strategies
or even rationality of others can only “worsen” the minimizing distribution, we conjecture that under
maxmin preferences such additional ambiguity can only enhance the incentive to buy at earlier prices,
which strengthens our results.
(21)Note that since we consider finite period games, the entire set of these conditional preferences can
be recovered through backward induction.
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seller’s offer) is optimal not only with respect to the other buyer’s strategy and the
history of the game but also with respect to the knowledge of its own behavior at all
future information sets, including those that will not occur if the type is to carry out its
own equilibrium plan. We discuss this issue further in section 6 .
Finally, the updating rule. Several rules have been proposed in the literature when
beliefs are sets of distributions. Perhaps the most prominent is the full Bayesian rule
where all the original distributions are retained (except, of course, those under which
it is impossible for the observed event to have occurred) and updated according to
Bayes’ rule. This is widely used in the extensive literature on robust statistics.(22)
A second well known rule is the generalized maximum likelihood rule, axiomatized by
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993). Under this, a subset of distributions from the original
set is retained and Bayes’ rule is applied to these only. The retained distributions are
the ones that assign maximum probability to the event that is known to have occurred.
Our results apply under both rules. We clarify this in section 6 after presenting the
results.
3.3 Characterizing Strategies
In this section, we discuss a particularly convenient way of representing strategies in
the game induced by the MDM.
Recall that at each price pk, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a buyer, if asked by the seller, must choose
one of two actions: accept or reject the seller’s offer. A strategy of a type of buyer i
is therefore a plan to accept or reject the seller’s offer at each price given the profile
of actions up to price pk−1. We assume that a buyer type accepts when indifferent
between accepting and rejecting and buys at the earlier period if indifferent between
buying in two different periods.(23)
(22)See, for example, Rios and Ruggeri (2000), Walley (1991). References from the economics literature
include Epstein and Schneider (2003), Pires (2002).
(23)Note that this need not be an entirely innocuous assumption. The problem is as follows. Since at
every node, a buyer’s feasible action space is accept or reject, the strategies are pure. If we now introduce
randomized strategies, in a non-EU setting , even if an agent is indifferent between two pure actions,
he might “strictly” prefer a randomization over them to either pure action. If this were the case here,
our assumption would require us to rule out randomizations. However, as we show in section 6, the
assumption is in fact without loss of generality in our model - our results are unaffected if the action
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An important feature of the strategies is that the decisions to buy by different types
must have a certain monotonicity property. Specifically, suppose that pk is the highest
price that a buyer of type v accepts. This means that the payoff v − pk is better than
the best (maxmin) expected payoff from either not accepting the seller’s offer at all or
accepting some future price. Since all types start with the same set of priors and use
the same rule to update the set, any type v′ > v must then also optimally accept the
offer pk rather than to continue. If pk is the first price at which type v plans to accept,
then the highest price that all higher types plan to accept must be at least as high as pk.
Suppose pk is the highest price accepted by v. Then the highest price that types above
v accept is either pk or a higher price, and the highest price that types below v accept is
either pk or a lower price.
For each price pk there is a set of types (possibly empty)who buy at pk. Note that mono-
tonicity implies that if pk is the highest price accepted by types v and v
′, where v > v′,
then the same is true of any type v′′ ∈ (v′, v). Therefore such a strategy gives rise to a
vector of n cut-offs {v1, . . . , vn} where 1 > v1 > v2 > . . . > vn > 0, and where types in
the (possibly degenerate) interval [v1, 1] accept p1, and the highest accepted price for
those in the (again, possibly degenerate) interval [vk, vk−1) is pk, k ∈ {2, . . . , n}.
The arguments above establish that any strategy satisfying monotonicity must give
rise to a vector of n cut-offs as described above. Thus without loss of generality we can
restrict attention to such strategies, and refer to these as “cut-off strategies.” Note that
any such cutoff-strategy currently places no restriction on the parts of the strategies
which specify actions at prices below the highest acceptable price. For a strategy to be
part of a perfect equilibrium, further restrictions are required and we clarify these once
we establish the next result.
Next, we define an “interior cut-off strategy.”
Definition 1 Interior Cut-off Strategy: A strategy of buyer i, i ∈ {1, 2}, is called an inte-
rior cut-off strategy if there exists a vector vi = (vi1, . . . , v
i
n), 0 6 v
i
n < v
i
n−1 < . . . < v
i
1 < 1,
such that for k ≥ 1, the highest price accepted by the non-degenerate interval of types [vik, v
i
k−1)
is pk, where v
i
0 ≡ 1.
space is extended to allow for randomizations.
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3.4 Characterizing Equilibria
In this section we discuss the properties of equilibria that results from the game in-
duced by MDM. We show that when the price sequence {p1, ..., pn} is chosen appro-
priately, any equilibrium has the property that for every price, there are sets of types
of positive measure for both buyers who plan to buy at that price. (For the rest of the
paper, the phrase “positive measure” is used with respect to the distribution F.) We
also define perfect cut-off strategy, i.e., cut-off strategies that are part of a perfect equi-
librium, and show existence of a symmetric equilibrium where both buyers follow the
same cut-off strategy.
For the rest of the section, we fix the preference parameter ε > 0.
The first result calculates the difference between the payoffs from buying at the current
price and waiting for the next lower price. This calculation is useful later when we
show that exactly such a calculation features in deriving equilibrium cut-off vectors.
Lemma 1 Suppose the item has not been sold in periods 1, . . . , k− 1 and in period k < n the
seller offers the item to buyer i at price pk (given by equation (3.1)). Suppose the strategy of j
gives rise to a vector of cut-offs vj = (v
j
1, . . . , v
j
n). For any type v of i the difference in payoff
from buying immediately versus waiting one period to buy at price pk+1 is
Gik(v) = v− pk − (1− ε)(v − pk+1)H
i
k (3.3)
where
Hik ≡
F(v
j
k) + F(v
j
k+1)
F(v
j
k) + F(v
j
k−1)
(3.4)
where v
j
0 ≡ 1.
We give a concise proof below. The detailed derivation of the conditional probabilities
used in the proof below is provided in section A.1 in the appendix.
Proof: If buyer i accepts the price pk, the payoff is v− pk. If the buyer waits to buy in
period k + 1 and if he manages to obtain the item then the ex post payoff is v− pk+1.
Let Hik denote the probability under the distribution F that i wins the item at pk+1
given that he refuses the current offer of pk Under epsilon contamination preference,
12
the buyer’s expected payoff from waiting one period is therefore given by (1− ε)(v −
pk+1)H
i(k). Therefore Gik(v) as specified. It remains to derive the expression for H
i
k.
We do this in two steps.
First, under the distribution F (i.e., if there were no ambiguity) the probability that i
wins the item at pk+1 conditional on the item not being sold at pk is given by
φik =
1
2
+
1
2
F(v
j
k+1)
F(v
j
k)
Second, under distribution F, if i passes at pk, the probability that the item is left unsold
at the end of the period k is given by:
πik =
2F(v
j
k)
F(v
j
k−1) + F(v
j
k)
where v
j
0 ≡ 1. Clearly H
i
k = π
i
k φ
i
k =
F(v
j
k) + F(v
j
k+1)
F(v
j
k) + F(v
j
k−1)
, where v
j
0 ≡ 1. This completes
the proof.‖
A strategy of a buyer is said to have a “gap” at pk if there are no types of that buyer
who buy at pk. The next result shows that there are no such gaps in equilibrium strate-
gies – a positive measure of types of both buyers buy at each price. This is crucial in
characterizing all equilibria.
Proposition 1 There exists δ > 0 such that for all δ < δ, in equilibrium, for each price pk,
k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there is a positive measure of types of each bidder who plan to buy at pk.
The formal proof is relegated to the appendix (sectionA.2). Here we provide an outline
of the proof. Suppose the strategy followed by buyer j has a gap , so that he does not
plan to buy at some prices.
For example, suppose there are no types of j who would accept offers of pk−ℓ through
pk (but that there are types of j who plan to buy at pk−ℓ−1 and some who plan to buy at
price pk+1). Let v
j
k−ℓ−1 be the lowest type of j who buys at price pk−ℓ−1. By definition
this type is indifferent between buying at pk−ℓ−1 and waiting till the price drops to
pk+1.
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Figure 1: A cut-off strategy for buyer i under n = 5 with gaps at p2 and p3 - there are no types
of bidder i who buys at p2 or p3. Our results rule out all gaps in equilibrium.
Now, according to the supposed equilibrium, all types in (pk+1, v
j
k−ℓ−1) refuse price
offers pk−ℓ through pk. Note first that if ℓ is at least 1, and j does not plan to buy at
prices pk−ℓ through pk, the best response from i should be to not buy at prices pk−ℓ
through pk−1. (It is possible that some type of i may want to buy at price pk; however,
the important point is that a gap from j will give rise to a corresponding gap from i.)
It is useful to consider two separate cases. First, suppose that ℓ is some fixed number
(so that informally, part of the description of the strategy of j is of the form “does not
buy at the next ℓ prices”). We show that as δ becomes small so that the gap between
prices decrease, H
j
k−ℓ−1, the conditional probability (under distribution F) that j ob-
tains the item in period k + 1 if he passes in period k− ℓ− 1 is approximately the same
as H
j
k, the conditional probability (again, under F) that j obtains the item in period k + 1
if he passes in period k.
But now consider type v
j
k−ℓ−1. This type is indifferent between pk−ℓ−1 and pk+1 and
therefore the lowest type who buys at pk−ℓ−1. Therefore a type just below (but arbi-
trarily close to) v
j
k−ℓ−1 is approximately indifferent between pk−ℓ−1 and pk+1. But since
H
j
k−ℓ−1 ≈ H
j
k, and pk < pk−ℓ−1, in period k when the seller actually offers the price pk,
such a type must strictly prefer to buy at pk rather than wait till period k + 1.
For the other case, consider now the situation where ℓ is not a fixed integer but varies
as δ (and hence n) varies. Intuitively, this is where the strategy of j is such that he
does not plan to buy at some prices (no matter how many there are) as long as these
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prices fall in some interval. Again, when δ is small, there is not much of a difference
between pk and pk+1, but since now there is some fixed finite gap between pk−ℓ−1 and
pk, if type v
j
k−ℓ−1 is indifferent in period k − ℓ− 1 between pk−ℓ−1 and pk+1, types just
below v
j
k−ℓ−1 must strictly prefer to buy at price pk when offered rather than wait till
price drops to pk+1, contradicting the supposed equilibrium behavior.
(24)
It is essentially this argument that rules out any gaps in the strategies adopted by either
player in equilibrium, proving the stated result. While this is the basic intuition, the
formal proof has to carefully check several cases, (and go through several other steps
to make the above informal argument rigorous) and is somewhat lengthy. We have
relegated it to the appendix.
Recall that our definition of an interior cut-off strategy above did not impose any out-
of-equilibrium restrictions. We now impose such restrictions and define a perfect cut-
off strategy. Note that for a strategy to be part of an equilibrium which is perfect,
it must specify behavior that is optimal at every information set given the (correct)
assessment of the behavior of the other player as well as one’s own behavior at every
continuation information set. Specifically, if, say pk(v) is the highest acceptable price
for type v, it must be better for v to accept pk(v) than to reject and act optimally at
every (off-equilibrium-path) future occasion if asked by the seller. The following result
shows that for the appropriately chosen price sequence, such optimality simply implies
that v must accept all subsequent (off-equilibrium-path) offers by the seller as well.
Lemma 2 Let pk(v) be the highest acceptable price for type v of buyer i, i ∈ {1, 2}. For δ < δ,
optimal behavior at any subsequent information set requires that type v also accepts all prices
lower than pk(v).
Proof: From Proposition 1 we know that for δ low enough, a positive measure of types
of each buyer buy at each price in equilibrium. Thus for every price pk, there is a set
(24)As the proof in the Appendix A.2 shows, the proof for second case is therefore easier than the first.
In the first, since pk−ℓ−1 − pk also becomes smaller as δ decreases, the sure gain v
j
k−ℓ−1 − pk is not too
much greater than the sure gain of v
j
k−ℓ−1− pk−ℓ−1 as δ decreases, so more work is needed to show that
the respective ambiguities in the two periods (as reflected in the terms (1− ε)H
j
k−ℓ−1 and (1− ε)H
j
k)
change in such a way that the types slightly below v
j
k−ℓ−1 prefer to accept the price pk than to wait till
period k + 1.
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of types for whom pk is the highest price at which they buy. Therefore equilibrium
strategies are interior cut-off strategies.
Next, suppose pk is the highest price at which type v buys. Suppose also that v does not
buy at some price pk+ℓ, ℓ > 1. From Proposition 1, there is some type v
′ for whom pk+ℓ
is the highest acceptable price. The monotonicity property then immediately gives a
contradiction. If v′ > v, then the higher price pk cannot be acceptable to v. On the
other hand, if v′ < v, then since v′ finds it optimal to accept when offered pk+ℓ, the
same must be true of the higher type v.
This shows that if pk is the highest price type v accepts in equilibrium, then the (off-
equilibrium-path) strategy of type v is to accept every lower price as well.‖
Therefore, a perfect cut-off strategy is an interior cut-off strategy, with the additional
requirement that if a type accepts any price, it must also accept all subsequent prices.
From definition 1, the highest price accepted by a non-degenerate interval of types
(vik−1, v
i
k] is pk. It follows that for a perfect cut-off strategy, v
i
k is the lowest type of i
who is indifferent between accepting pk or continuing for just one more period and
accepting the next available price pk+1.
We now use the results above to characterize perfect cut-off strategies. Since any equi-
librium involves such strategies, this characterizes all equilibria.
Proposition 2 For δ < δ, in any equilibrium the strategy of any bidder i is a perfect cut-off
strategy vi = (vi1, . . . , v
i
n) where vn = pn. Further, for 1 6 k 6 (n − 1), v
i
k ∈ (pk, v
i
k−1),
where v0 ≡ 1, and v
i
k is given by
vik = pk + ∆k
(1− ε)Hik
1− (1− ε)Hik
where Hik is given by equation (3.4). For any given v
j, vik is unique.
Proof: The fact that when δ is small, in any equilibrium bidders must use a perfect cut-
off strategy follows directly from Lemma 2 above. From Lemma 3 (in Appendix A.2),
we have vin = pn. From Lemma 1 we know that if the strategy of j gives rise to the
cut-off vector vj = (v
j
1, . . . , v
j
n), then for any type v of i the difference in payoff from
buying immediately versus waiting one period to buy at price pk+1 is given by G
i
k(v).
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Since the type vik is the lowest type that buys at k, it must be that v
i
k is determined by
solving Gik(v) = 0 for v.
Now, clearly, Gik(pk) < 0. Therefore v
i
k > pk. Since (as shown by Proposition 1) a
positive measure of types of i plan to buy at each price, we also have vik < v
i
k−1. Thus
it must be that Gik(vk−1) > 0. Further, G
i
k(v) is strictly increasing and continuous in
v. Therefore if an equilibrium (vi , vj) exists, for any given vj there exists a unique
vik ∈ (pk, v
i
k−1) such that G
i
k(v
i
k) = 0.
Finally, Gik(v
i
k) = 0 implies (from equation (3.3))
vik − pk = (1− ε)(v
i
k − pk+1)H
i
k
= (1− ε)(vik − pk + ∆k)H
i
k
Solving, we get the stated equation.‖
The result above characterizes all equilibria. Note that any equilibrium has the stan-
dard “skimming” property: a higher type buys earlier (at a higher price) than a lower
type. Finally, we prove existence.
Proposition 3 There is δ > 0 such that for any δ < δ, a symmetric equilibrium exists.
The proof is essentially an application of Brouwer’s fixed point theorem and has been
relegated to the appendix.
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4 The Main Result
We now present the main result of the paper which follows directly from the charac-
terization results derived in the last section. For any preference parameter ε > 0, the
seller can design a MDM to allocate the object (almost) efficiently and can extract (al-
most) all surplus. More specifically, for any given ε > 0, there is δ∗(ε) such that for any
chosen δ ∈ (0, δ∗(ε)) and any η > 0, the reserve type is no greater than η (i.e., the item
is sold if at least one buyer’s valuation is greater than η) and no buyer type obtains (an
ex post) surplus greater than δ. (Of course, the types that do not buy get zero surplus.
However, the seller makes zero revenue from them as well and so an important point
of the result is that while extracting almost all surplus from the types that buy, the mass
of non-buying types can be made to be arbitrarily small.) Since the set of types who
are excluded are at most [0, η] and the ex post surplus of the types who buy is at most
δ, and since both δ and η can be arbitrarily small, the result follows.
Proposition 4 For any preference parameter ε > 0, there exists δ∗(ε) > 0 such that for any
δ < δ∗(ε), and η > 0, there is a MDM such that in any equilibrium of the game induced by
the MDM, the item is sold if at least one buyer has valuation greater than η and no type obtains
an ex post surplus greater than δ.
Proof: The results in the previous section show that for any ε > 0, there is δ∗(ε) > 0
such that whenever δ < δ∗(ε), an equilibrium exists, and all equilibria can be charac-
terized as in Proposition 2. Further, as noted in section 3.1, for any η ∈ (0, 1), there
exists an integer T such by choosing n = T, the price sequence (which consists of n
prices) of the MDM covers at least a fraction (1− η) of types so that the item is not
sold to at most types in [0, η]. Thus, it only remains to show that no type that buys gets
an ex post surplus greater than δ.
Now, since types in [vk, vk−1) buy at price pk, the ex post surplus of any type buying
at pk is at most vk−1− pk, which is bounded above by δ as follows: From the necessary
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conditions for equilibrium presented in Proposition 2, we have
vk−1 − pk = pk−1 − pk + ∆k−1
(1− ε)Hk−1
1− (1− ε)Hk−1
< ∆k−1 + ∆k−1
(1− ε)
ε
=
∆k−1
ε
= δ
(
1− δ
1− δ + δε
)k−1
< δ
where the second step follows from the fact that pk−1 − pk = ∆k−1 and the fact that
(1−ε)Hk−1(vk−1)
1−(1−ε)Hk−1(vk−1)
<
(1−ε)
ε since Hk−1(vk−1) < 1. The final inequality follows from the
fact that
(
1−δ
1−δ+δε
)k−1
< 1 for any ε > 0. This completes the proof.‖
The basic intuition for the result is that for any v and any price p where p < v, the
payoff from buying at p is v − p whereas the payoff from waiting one more period
is v − p + ∆p times the probability that the current buyer obtains the item in the next
period. (Here p − ∆p is the next price). With epsilon contamination preferences, the
buyer attaches at least probability ε that the item gets sold before he has the chance to
obtain it next period. Thus the loss from waiting is at least (v− p)(ε) whereas the gain
from waiting is of the order ∆p. For any given ε, by making ∆p successively small, the
gain from waiting can be made arbitrarily small. However, in order to extract at least
δ amount of surplus, we need buyer types to buy at (sufficiently high) prices such that
the ex post surplus, v− p, is at most δ. In other words, the loss from waiting, which is
small when δ is small still needs to be larger than the gain from waiting and the price
sequence is constructed in such a way that this is achieved.
Note that this cannot happen in the standard (i.e., the unique prior) model. There, for
any type v, as long as the seller is selling to types below v with positive probability, the
surplus of type v cannot be made to be arbitrarily small.(25) Roughly speaking, in the
(25)Of course in the standard setting, the price sequence considered above will not work since when
ε = 0, pk = 1− δ for all k. What we mean is that there is no price sequence that can extract almost full
surplus in the ambiguity-neutral setting. Perhaps this is obvious from the standard mechanism design
exercise; there, the optimal revenue maximizing mechanism does not allocate the object if no bidder’s
type is greater than v∗ where v∗ −
1− F(v∗)
f (v∗)
= 0 and types v ≥ v∗ obtain expected surplus equal to∫ v
v∗
F(y)dy. Given that the probability of obtaining the item is bounded, ex post surplus cannot be made
arbitrarily small.
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absence of ambiguity, given that F is smooth, the expected gain and expected loss from
waiting shrink at the same rate as the price gap becomes smaller.
5 A Numerical Example
Suppose F is the uniform distribution on the unit interval. We know that for any k < n
the equation for vk is
vk = pk + ∆k
(1− ε)Hk
1− (1− ε)Hk
where
Hk =
(v1 + v2)/(1 + v1) for k = 1, and(vk + vk+1)/(vk−1 + vk) for 2 6 k 6 (n− 1)
Given vn = pn, the equations can be solved for any given n. It can be directly verified
(as well as already noted in Proposition 3) that there is a unique positive solution for
any vk.
The following table shows a few steps for δ = 0.05, and ε = 0.2. We stop as soon as
we cross 0.9 (i.e. in this exercise we extract a rent of at least 0.95 from the top 10%
types). In this case n = 7, and the prices pk and cutoffs vk are as shown. The right hand
column shows the maximum rent obtained by any type. The rent obtained by any type
v ∈ [v(k+1), vk) is given by v− p(k+1) 6 vk − p(k+1), which is the maximum rent.
Price Vk Maximum Rent
0.9500 0.9874 0.0500
0.9401 0.9773 0.0473
0.9303 0.9671 0.0470
0.9206 0.9570 0.0465
0.9110 0.9468 0.0460
0.9015 0.9342 0.0453
0.8922 0.8922 0.0421
It is interesting to compare this with the outcome of the static optimal mechanism.
Bose et al. (2006) show that in their mechanism, the reserve type, v∗ is given by the
equation
v∗ − (1− ε)
1− F(v∗)
f (v∗)
= 0
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and the (expected) surplus of type v is equal to (1 − ε)
∫ v
v∗
F(y)dy.(26) When F is the
uniform distribution, the surplus is approximately equal to 0.32 for v = 1. In contrast,
in the MDM, type v = 1 gets a surplus of exactly δ which in this numerical example is
0.05 (and, in general, can be made arbitrarily small).
Returning to the example, note that continuing in this fashion (i.e. by increasing n
beyond 7), it is possible to extract a rent of at least 0.95 from any fraction of types less
than 1 (i.e. any type is left with a rent of at most 0.05). The figure below shows the
price steps for n = 1000 for different values of δ (given ε = 0.2). The rate of change of
prices is given by
pk − p(k+1)
pk
=
δε
(1− δ+ δε)
This is increasing in δ. So with lower δ, prices fall “more slowly.”
δ=0.05
δ=0.025
0 1000500
1
p
k
k
0.75
0.5
0.25
Figure 2: With ε = 0.2 and δ = 0.05, 500 steps is enough to for price to get very close to zero -
extracting a rent of at least 1− δ = 0.95 from almost all types. With δ = 0.025 the rent extracted
from each type is at least 0.975, but extracting this from almost all types requires about 1000
price steps.
(26)They show that the optimal (static) direct revelation mechanism is a full insurance mechanism, and
a type’s surplus, when reporting its type truthfully is a function of its own report only and do not vary
with the report of the other buyer. Hence, under truthtelling, expected surplus is also ex post surplus.
For details see Bose et al. (2006).
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6 Discussion
Maxmin preferences, and in particular the epsilon contamination formulation, have
been used in both economics and statistics literatures. Our results show the effects
that a dynamic mechanism can have in a setting which is IPV in all aspects other than
the fact that the buyers are ambiguity averse. The preferences are modeled using the
epsilon contamination specification. In this section we discuss our modeling choices
and certain aspects of our results. Some of these issues were briefly mentioned in
earlier sections.
The driving force behind the result is that the seller has the ability to make repeated
offers to the buyers. The game is constructed in such a way that at each stage the buyer
can accept, and get a sure payoff, or wait, and get an ambiguous payoff. Since the re-
sults depend on the maxmin expected payoffs (from waiting) that the buyers calculate
at each stage using some updating rule (from an updated set of distributions), let us
comment on the updating rule first. In particular, as we mentioned before (section 3.2),
the two most commonly used updating rules are the full Bayesian and the generalized
maximum likelihood rules and we first argue that our results hold under both of these
rules.
6.1 Full Bayesian and Generalized Maximum Likelihood Updating Rules
In the full Bayesian updating rule the decision maker uses Bayes rule to update all
the distributions (except those under which the observed event is impossible to have
occurred) and the payoff is equal to the minimum expected utility calculated by con-
sidering this entire set of updated distributions. Since it is clear that with epsilon con-
tamination preference where the decision maker puts epsilon weight on the worst pos-
sible distribution from the set of all distributions, it is clear that our results hold under
the full Bayesian updating rule, we focus our discussion on the generalized maximum
likelihood rule. Under this rule only those distributions are retained (and updated)
that gives the maximum likelihood to the event known to have occurred. In our case,
in any period k, faced with an offer pk, a buyer puts a weight (1− ε) on his chances of
getting the item in future under the distribution F, and puts a weight ε on the worst
distribution in terms of his getting the item if he passes, conditional on the event that
22
he knows has happened. But, in period k, the fact that the seller makes an offer to a
buyer means that the buyer knows that the other buyer has not bought the item in any
previous period. In other words, the buyer knows that the other buyer’s type must be
in [0, vk−1). Therefore, when calculating the minimum expected payoff from waiting,
instead of taking the expectation with respect to all updated distributions, the buyer
considers only those that are “most favorable” in terms of the event [0, vk−1) which is
known to have occurred. However, within this latter set, the worst distribution is still
the one the puts the entire weight on the event that the current buyer will not obtain
the item if he waits. Therefore the minimum expected payoff is the same as under the
full Bayesian rule. Put differently, in our setting, the maximum likelihood rule has no
“real” additional bite over the full Bayesian rule.
Note that in general, even though we have discussed only two updating rule (preva-
lent in the literature), as long as the updating rule does not throw away these worst
distributions, the results in the paper should go through. We are not aware of any
general argument that would require removal of these worst distributions as the game
progresses. To be specific, consider an event [vk, vk−1) and note that the set of distri-
butions that the buyers consider initially has amongst it (at least) one distribution F˜
which puts an epsilon weight on this event. Now, suppose the buyer is told that the
event [vk−1, 1] has not occurred. There is no obvious reason to suggest that this extra
information should make F˜ irrelevant.
6.2 Randomization
We have formally defined a buyer’s decision making problem in any period as a choice
between accepting or rejecting the seller’s offer. This obviously means that we have re-
stricted the buyers’ action sets in any period (and hence strategies over the entire game)
to be pure. A question naturally arises therefore as to whether the results continue to
hold if we removed this restriction and allowed buyers to randomize over the pure
actions if they so desired. Now, with non-EU preferences, this is a particularly delicate
issue since there might be a strict preference for randomization (see Crawford (1990)
for the seminal contribution). In fact the (crucial) assumption on uncertainty aversion
in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)(27) shows that unlike EU preferences, a player with
(27)Assumption A5, page 144.
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maxmin preferences may be indifferent between two pure strategies, yet strictly prefer
a mixture of the two to either pure strategy. However, we now argue that allowing for
randomization does not create a problem in our model.
To see this, note that in any period a buyer has only two pure actions (accept or reject),
and, crucially, the action “accept” gives a certain (i.e. non-random) payoff. Let A and
R denote accept and reject respectively. Consider the problem of a buyer in period
k who receives an offer to buy at price pk from the seller. The payoff E(A) from A
is simply v − pk. Let Emin(R) denote the maxmin payoff from rejecting offer pk (and
choosing the optimal action in the future). Finally, let Emin(α) denote the maxmin
payoff from any randomized strategy, where α ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of accepting.
Since E(A) is a certain payoff, it follows that Emin(α) = αE(A) + (1− α)Emin(R) 6
max [E(A), Emin(R)], where the inequality is strict whenever E(A) 6= Emin(R). Hence,
whenever a pure action A or R is strictly preferred over the other, the preferred pure
action continues to be optimal even if we allowed for randomizations. When E(A) =
Emin(R), a randomized strategy gives the same payoff and therefore our assumption
that a buyer accepts when indifferent between accepting and rejecting any price pk is
without loss of generality.
6.3 Dynamic Consistency
Preferences satisfy dynamic consistency if an optimal plan based on prior preferences
(ex ante plan) coincides with the sequentially optimal plan in a decision tree. This is
unproblematic in the expected utility paradigm,(28) but does not arise naturally under
ambiguity. In this section we discuss the ramifications of this for our model. We ex-
plain below how this relates to our work and why this issue is not central to deriving
our formal results. The next part of this section provides a discussion of the general
issues relating to the problem of dynamic consistency under ambiguity. Readers not
interested in this specific issue can skip the later part of this section without any loss
of continuity.
(28)In the expected utility paradigm, assuming that preferences satisfy dynamic consistency is
not a problem if one assumes that the updating follows Bayes rule. It is well known (see
Epstein and Schneider (2003)) that if the conditional preferences at every time-event pair satisfy ex-
pected utility theory, they satisfy dynamic consistency if and only if the updating is done using Bayes
Rule.
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6.3.1 Sophisticated dynamic choice: consistent plans
Siniscalchi (2006) separates the issue of dynamic consistency from the idea of sophis-
ticated behavior by axiomatizing preferences over decision trees rather than over acts.
Dynamic consistency is a property of preferences over acts at different nodes in a tree.
Assuming properties of preferences over trees allows abstraction from the from the
issue of dynamic consistency. However, this allows a characterization of consistent
planning, which formalizes the idea of “sophisticated behavior”: a sophisticated deci-
sion maker correctly anticipates his future preferences. Siniscalchi provides a coherent
theory of dynamic choice without the need to appeal to dynamic consistency.
This idea is very much the spirit of the model here, and therefore the issue of dynamic
consistency does not affect our formal results directly. Our model assumes sophisti-
cated behavior by agents in the above sense, and therefore in all our formal derivations
we use the idea that agents are forward looking and form consistent plans. We do not
at any point invoke ex ante planning, and therefore the question of whether such plans
coincide with sequential choice has no direct bearing on our formal results. How-
ever, the issue affects the interpretation of the results, in particular the role of dynamic
mechanisms in contrast to static ones. The question of ensuring dynamic consistency
is discussed further below.
6.3.2 General issues
We now proceed to explain why violations of dynamic consistency arises naturally un-
der ambiguity, and discuss implications of enforcing consistency by restricting priors.
It is well known that without further restrictions on the set of priors, the full Bayesian
updating rule (as well as the maximum likelihood updating rule) gives rise to dynam-
ically inconsistent preferences over acts when conditional preferences at every time-
event pair satisfy themaxmin utility theory. Several papers (e.g. Epstein and Schneider 2003,
Hanany and Klibanoff 2006, Maccheroni et al. 2006, Klibanoff et al. 2006) propose the-
ories of dynamic behavior by imposing dynamic consistency as an axiom that prefer-
ences must satisfy.
While it is often considered desirable, especially for practical purposes, to have dy-
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namic consistency, it has also been pointed out that in certain situations it makes more
intuitive sense to allow for preferences that violate dynamic consistency.(29) Here we
briefly sketch the argument depicting one such situation. The following example and
the associated discussion is borrowed from Epstein and Schneider (2003). The reader
should consult the original article for a fuller exposition.(30)
Consider the Ellsberg urn experiment in which there are 30 balls that are red and 60
that are either blue or green. A ball is drawn at random from this urn and we are
interested in the decision-maker’s preference over acts whose payoffs are dependent
on the color of the ball drawn. A natural state space is Ω = {R, B,G} and acts are,
as usual, mapping from states to real numbers. So for example, the act (1, 0, 0) pays
1 if the ball drawn is red and zero otherwise. To introduce dynamics in the simplest
possible way suppose a ball is drawn in t = 0, some information is revealed at t = 1
and finally the color is revealed (hence all uncertainty is resolved) and payoffs given at
t = 2. Specifically, suppose the information revealed in t = 1 can be expressed by the
following filtration of the state space: F1 = {{R, B}, {G}}.
Consider first the atemporal ranking of two acts (1, 0, 1) and (0, 1, 1). Typical choice
shows the time 0 ranking to be
(0, 1, 1) ≻0 (1, 0, 1) (6.1)
which is intuitive given the decision-maker’s ambiguity about the exact number of
blue versus green balls (there is no ambiguity about the total number of blue and green
balls). For maxmin utility, this ranking is supported by the set of priors P given by
P =
{
p =
(
1
3
, pB,
2
3
− pB :
1
6
≤ pB ≤
1
2
)}
where ambiguity about the number of blue versus green balls is reflected in the range
of pB. However, to see the problem that arises in the dynamic model, note that with
maxmin utility and using the full Bayesian updating rule (i.e., at time t = 1, the up-
dated priors are obtained from using Bayes rule on all the priors in the set P), one gets
the t = 1 period ranking as
(1, 0, 1) ≻1,{R,B} (0, 1, 1) and (1, 0, 1) ∼1,{G} (0, 1, 1) (6.2)
(29)Further, as noted above, even for practical purposes it is possible to model rational agents who carry
our consistent plans if, the conditional preferences are defined over trees (rather than acts) and the axiom
of sophistication is imposed.
(30)See also Hanany and Klibanoff (2006).
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In other words, in period t = 1, the decision-maker strictly prefers (1, 0, 1) to (0, 1, 1)
if event {R, B} obtains and is indifferent over the two acts if the complement of event
{R, B} obtains. Dynamic consistency then requires that in period t = 0, act (1, 0, 1)
should be strictly preferred to act (0, 1, 1). But this contradicts (6.1), and therefore
dynamic consistency is violated.
As Epstein and Schneider go on to explain in their paper, to ensure dynamic consis-
tency one needs a restriction on the set of allowable priors; in particular one needs
the set of priors to be what they call rectangular.(31) For the example above, P is not
Ft− rectangular and they show the smallest rectangular set of priors (containing P), is
given by:
P ′ =
{
p =
(
1
3
1
3 + p
′
B
1
3 + pB
, pB
1
3 + p
′
B
1
3 + pB
,
2
3
− p′B
)
:
1
6
≤ pB, p
′
B ≤
1
2
}
With the set of priors P ′, the period t = 0 ranking is dynamically consistent with the
period t = 1 ranking as in (6.2). Of course, as Epstein and Schneider point out, this
comes at the cost of reversing the ranking in (6.1). The lesson from this is that in some
settings where there are intuitive choices for different periods, ambiguity may result in
dynamic consistency being problematic.(32)
In fact, we feel that imposing dynamic consistency, in some sense, goes against the
spirit of ambiguity aversion. To see what we mean, note that the essence of ambigu-
ity aversion is relaxation of the sure thing principle. Under the sure thing principle,
if the decision maker’s conditional preferences are such that act h is preferred to g ir-
respective of whether event A happens or A∼ (the complement of event A) happens,
the unconditional preference should be such that act h is preferred to act g. Dynamic
consistency requires that if at period t = 1 act h is preferred to g if either event A or A∼
is known to have happened, at the period t = 0 act h must be preferred to act g. Hence
when preferences exhibit ambiguity aversion (and involve violation of sure thing prin-
ciple within a period), imposing this sort of restriction over conditional preferences
across periods may not be the right thing to do.
(31)The basic idea is to construct the set of priors via backward induction by considering one-step-
ahead conditionals. Clearly, this ensures dynamic consistency (under full Bayesian updating rule) by
construction.
(32)Another way to see the problem with P ′. is as follows. P ′, gives a range of values for the odds of
drawing a red ball, which differ from 1/3 except when pB = p
′
B. However, at t = 0, it is known that there
are exactly 30 red balls in the urn containing 90 balls.
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We should add, lest we be misunderstood, that we do not mean to suggest that am-
biguity averse decision-makers should never satisfy dynamic consistency. In fact, Ep-
stein and Schneider give another example in their paper where no intuitive problem
arises in making the set of priors rectangular (and hence ensuring dynamically con-
sistent preferences). Also, we obviously do not mean that there is anything formally
wrong in having ambiguity aversion with dynamic consistency; they are logically dis-
tinct features and in fact the papers we cite do just that - they construct formal models
where decision-makers have ambiguity averse but dynamically consistent preference.
What we mean, and here we are probably just echoing Epstein and Schneider, is that
imposing dynamic consistency as a condition–that is insisting that it should always
hold–leaves out interesting and intuitive behavior in settings with ambiguity. Our ob-
jective in this paper is to study a dynamic situation with ambiguity averse preferences
where we do not have dynamic consistency (but as mentioned before, the buyers do
carry out consistent plans since they are sophisticated and know their future behav-
ior). The main result we get is surprising but that only goes on to show that much
more work is needed before we can fully understand ambiguity averse (and in general
many non-expected utility) preferences in dynamic settings.(33)
6.4 Restricting the contaminating set of distributions
Finally, it has often been pointed out, especially in the statistics literature, that the
version of epsilon contamination that we use is too general: namely putting epsilon
weight on the possibility that the true distribution might be any distribution may actu-
ally be allowing for too much. In particular, a ”reasonable” modification of the model
might involve restricting the set of contaminating distributions so that each element of
the set satisfies certain properties. Here we sketch an informal argument involving an
example to suggest why we think that in many situations our results will go through
even if one made some of these modifications. So, suppose the contaminating set of
distributions on [0, 1] is restricted to contain only those that satisfy differentiability and
(33)As Epstein and Schneider show, the set of rectangular priors can be constructed by backward in-
duction from one-step-ahead conditionals when there is an exogenously given filtration. However, in
a game the equilibrium strategies determine how information is revealed - in other words the filtration
is endogenous. It might be an interesting question to explore whether, or how, rectangularity can be
extended to these settings.
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monotone hazard rate.(34) More specifically, consider the example where the set of con-
taminating distributions are of the form Ln(v) = v
n. Each distribution in this family is
differentiable and satisfies monotone hazard rate.(35) Now, the conditional probability
of the event [vk, vk−1), given the event [0, vk−1) is given by 1−
(
vk
vk−1
)n
, and note that
infn
(
vk
vk−1
)n
= 0. Hence, in this case, it is as if, for all practical purposes, there is a con-
taminating distribution that puts the entire mass on [vk, vk−1) which is what is done in
the formal model of the paper.
7 Conclusion
Evidence (experimental and otherwise) suggests that it is important for economic mod-
els to explore the consequence of non-expected utility preferences. The fairly large (and
growing) literature in this area has given us many valuable insights.
In this paper, we consider a private values auction model with ambiguity and buyers
with ambiguity averse preferences. In the standard setting with a unique prior, the
optimal mechanism leaves all but the lowest participating type with information rent.
Previous work shows that even under ambiguity aversion, the optimal static mecha-
nism leaves buyer types with rent. In contrast, we show that in the latter environment,
dynamic mechanisms have more power, and using the epsilon contamination specifi-
cation to model ambiguity aversion, we construct a very simple dynamic mechanism
that extracts almost all surplus.
We view the contribution of our work as providing an example of the non-standard
effects that ambiguity aversion can have on mechanism design. Our formal model
uses the epsilon contamination specification and clearly our result of full surplus ex-
traction is related to this setting. Nevertheless, the idea that in auction like settings,
dynamic mechanisms can extract greater surplus than static ones by exploiting ambi-
guity aversion is a more general one. By showing that the equivalence between static
(34)The interpretation is that as before the decision maker puts a weight of ε on the true distribution not
being F. Now, however, he has confidence that the true distribution, even if not F, has certain properties
similar to F.
(35)Of course this is only a particular family of distributions having the property of being differentiable
and havingmonotone hazard rate. However, since the minimum cannot increase if sets aremade bigger,
considering only a particular family like this is enough for the purpose of illustrating our point.
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and dynamic mechanisms (standard under the unique prior model) need not extend
to a dynamic setting, our results strike a cautionary note when working in the non-
unique prior environment. This is further highlighted by the contrast between our
results and those in Bose et al. (2006) who study optimal static auctions under ambi-
guity, and leads us to conclude that a straightforward application of the revelation
principle has its limitations when preferences are no longer characterized by subjec-
tive expected utility. Understanding the proper scope of the revelation principle with
such “non-probabilistically sophisticated” preferences is an interesting question that
we hope to address in future research.
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8 Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Some Conditional Probabilities
This section derives some conditional probabilities that are used repeatedly in the anal-
ysis.
Let Hik denote the probability under the distribution F (i.e., if there were no ambiguity)
that i wins the item at pk+1 given that he refuses the current offer of pk.
This can be calculated in two parts.
First, let φik denote the probability under the distribution F that i wins the item at pk+1
conditional on the item not being sold at pk.
Second, let πik denote the probability (again, this is the probability under F) that if i
refuses the current offer pk the object remains unsold till the next price pk+1.
Then we have Hik = π
i
kφ
i
k.
Calculating φik: φ
i
k can be derived is as follows. If buyer i is asked first in period k + 1
(which happens with probability 1/2), he wins for sure. If j is asked first (probability
1/2), i wins only if j passes. Given that the object is unsold at pk, we know that the
type of j is lower than v
j
k. Therefore the probability that j will refuse pk+1 given that he
has refused pk is given by Prob(v
j
< v
j
k+1|v
j
< v
j
k) =
F(v
j
k+1)
F(v
j
k)
. Therefore
φik =
1
2
+
1
2
F(v
j
k+1)
F(v
j
k)
(A.1)
Calculating piik: Next, π
i
k can be derived as follows.
First, we need to work out the probability that a buyer is being asked first given that he
is asked whether he wants to buy at pk. The conditioning on being asked is important
since the fact that a buyer is asked whether he wants to buy at pk conveys information
about whether he is first or second. Let qi ∈ {1, 2} denote the position (1st or 2nd) of
buyer i in any period. Further, let Ai denote the event that “buyer i is asked whether
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he wants to buy at pk.” We want to determine Prob(q
i = 1|Ai).
Prob(qi = 1|Ai) =
Prob(qi = 1)Prob(Ai|qi = 1)
Prob(qi = 1)Prob(Ai|qi = 1) + Prob(qi = 2)Prob(Ai|qi = 2)
=
1
2
1
2 +
1
2
F(v
j
k
)
F(v
j
k−1)
=
F(v
j
k−1)
F(v
j
k−1) + F(v
j
k)
where v
j
0 ≡ 1.
Similarly,
Prob(qi = 2|Ai) = 1− Prob(qi = 1|Ai) =
F(v
j
k)
F(v
j
k−1) + F(v
j
k)
where v
j
0 ≡ 1 as before.
We are now ready to derive πik. Note that given i refuses pk, the probability of the
object being unsold if i is second (qi = 2) is 1, and the probability of the object being
unsold if i is first (qi = 1) is
F(v
j
k)
F(v
j
k−1)
. Therefore
πik = Prob(q
i = 1|Ai)
F(v
j
k)
F(v
j
k−1)
+ Prob(qi = 2|Ai)(1)
=
2F(v
j
k)
F(v
j
k−1) + F(v
j
k)
(A.2)
where v
j
0 ≡ 1.
Finally, using equations (A.1) and (A.2), we get
Hik = π
i
k φ
i
k =
F(v
j
k) + F(v
j
k+1)
F(v
j
k) + F(v
j
k−1)
where v
j
0 ≡ 1.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
In this section we prove Proposition 1. The basic outline of our argument is as follows.
In Lemma 3 we show that in any equilibrium, for both buyers, the cutoff type for price
pn is in fact pn and that there are types of positive measure who plan to buy at price pn.
Next, we show in Lemma 4 that for both buyers, there are types of positive measure
that plan to buy at p1. Lemma 5 is crucial, it shows that whenever δ is sufficiently small,
given that a positive measure of types of both buyers buy at prices p1 and pn, there
must be a positive measure of types of both buyers who buy at price pn−1. Proposition 1
now follows from a recursive argument: provided types of positive measure plan to
buy at prices p1 and pk+1, ..., pn, there must be types of positive measure who plan to
buy at pk as well.
We remind the reader that the term vik, is used to denote the lowest type of buyer i who
plans to buy at price pk. Also, to avoid confusion with respect to superscripts versus
exponents, in the rest of this Appendix, we refer to the two buyers as i and j instead of
1 and 2.
Lemma 3 In any equilibrium, vin = v
j
n = pn. Further, a positive measure of types of both
buyers plan to buy at price pn but not at any earlier price.
Proof: Consider a type v ∈ (pn, pn−1) of either buyer. Buying at any price greater than
pn−1 is dominated by not buying at all but not buying at price pn gives a zero surplus
whereas buying at price pn gives a surplus v− pn > 0. Hence types of positive measure
(pn, pn−1) must plan to buy at pn but not at any earlier price. Furthermore, the lowest
type (the type that is indifferent between buying at price pn and not buying at all) that
buys at pn is pn, so that v
i
n = v
j
n = pn. ‖
In what follows, we use the word “probability” to mean probability with respect to
the distribution F. (This allows us to avoid writing the phrase “with respect to the
distribution F” repeatedly.)
Lemma 4 In equilibrium a positive measure of types of each buyer plan to buy at p1.
Proof: Consider any buyer, say, buyer j and suppose on the contrary that no type of
buyer j plans to buy at price p1. More generally, for 1 6 k < n suppose buyer j does
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not plan to buy at prices p1, . . . , pk so that pk+1 is the first price at which buyer j buys.
(Formally, this is denoted as v
j
1 = . . . = v
j
k = 1 and v
j
k+1 < 1).
Since j does not plan to buy at prices p1, . . . , pk, it is clear that i should not plan to buy
at prices p1, . . . , pk−1. Recall (from appendix A.1) that H
i
k is the probability that buyer
i wins at pk+1 given that he refuses the current offer of pk. Note that if i refuses pk, the
probability that the game reaches pk+1 is 1. Thus π
i
k = 1 Therefore H
i
k = π
i
kφ
i
k = φ
i
k =
1/2+ (1/2)F(v
j
k+1).
(36) Define the following function.
Gik(v) ≡ v− pk − (1− ε)(v − pk+1)H
i
k
Gik(v) can be rewritten as (v− pk)(1− (1− ε)H
i
k)− (1− ε)∆k H
i
k. Note that
Gik(1) = (1− pk)(1− (1− ε)φ
i
k)− (1− ε)∆k H
i
k
> δε− (1− ε)∆k
> δε− (1− ε)∆1
= δε
(
1−
(1− ε)(1− δ)
1− δ+ δε
)
=
δε2
1− δ+ δε
> 0
where the second step follows from the fact that (1− pk) > (1− p1) = δ, and the fact
that Hik < 1, and the third step uses ∆1 > ∆k.
Since Gik(v) is continuous, increasing in v, and negative at v = pk, there exists v
i
k such
that Gik(v) > 0 for v > v
i
k and G
i
k(v
i
k) = 0. Since we know that i does not plan to buy at
any earlier price than pk, it must be that types [v
i
k, 1] of buyer i plan to buy at pk.
Now, let H
j
k be the probability that j wins at pk+1 if j refuses the current offer of pk
in period k. Since we have just shown that some types of i plan to buy at price pk,
irrespective of what i plans to do at price pk+1, buyer j knows in period k that he
cannot expect to obtain the item for sure in period k + 1. Now, for buyer j, let
G
j
k(v) ≡ v− pk − (1− ε)(v − pk+1)H
j
k
We have
(36)Note that this is the same formula as in equation (A.1), since here F(v
j
k) = F(v
j
k−1) = 1.
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G
j
k(1) = 1− pk − (1− ε)(1− pk+1)H
j
k
= (1− pk)(1− (1− ε)H
j
k)− (1− ε)∆k H
j
k
> δε− (1− ε)∆k
≥ δε− (1− ε)∆1
=
δε2
1− δ+ δε
> 0
where the first inequality follows since H
j
k < 1, and (1− pk) > (1− p1) = δ and the
second one follows since ∆k ≤ ∆1. Since G
j
k(v) is increasing and continuous, there are
types of j of positive measure near 1 whowould deviate and buy at pk. Contradiction.‖
From above, we know that each buyer has types who buy at both p1 and pn. To com-
plete the proof we need to show that whenever δ is sufficiently small, this is true at
other prices between p1 and pn as well.
To prove this, we start by showing that both buyers must have types who plan to buy
at pn−1. Then we show that if there are buyer types who plan to buy at prices pn−k
to pn for k ≥ 2, then there must also be types who plan to buy at price pn−k−1. This
completes the proof.
Let us now show that both buyers have types who plan to buy at price pn−1.
Suppose this is not true. In particular, suppose buyer j does not plan to buy at prices
{pn−ℓ+1, . . . , pn−1}where 2 6 ℓ 6 n− 1, but plans to buy at pn−ℓ (and of course at pn).
Since j does not plan to buy at prices {pn−ℓ+1, . . . , pn−1}, the best response by i involves
not planning to buy at prices {pn−ℓ+1, . . . , pn−2} whenever ℓ > 2. Note further that in
that case, there must be types of i who plan to buy at pn−ℓ. (Otherwise types of j buying
at pn−ℓ can profitably deviate to, say, pn−2. This contradicts the assumption that j buys
at pn−ℓ). Armed with these facts, let us now show the result.
Lemma 5 There is δ > 0 such that for δ < δ there are types (of positive measure) of j who buy
at pn−1.
Proof: In the proposed equilibrium, types v > v
j
n−ℓ of j buy at prices p > pn−ℓ, with
type v
j
n−ℓ and some types just above buying at price pn−ℓ. But since j does not buy at
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prices {pn−ℓ+1, . . . , pn−1}, types just below v
j
n−ℓ must buy at pn and not before. There-
fore, in the proposed equilibrium, it must be that v
j
n−ℓ is indifferent between buying at
pn−ℓ or pn. So we have, for buyer j,
v
j
n−ℓ − pn−ℓ = (1− ε)(v
j
n−ℓ − pn)H
j
n−ℓ (A.3)
where H
j
n−ℓ = π
j
n−ℓ π̂
j
n−1 φ
j
n−1, where π
j
n−ℓ is the probability that the object is unsold
at pn−ℓ given that j refuses the current offer of pn−ℓ, π̂
j
n−1 is the probability that the
object will remain unsold at pn−1, and φ
j
n−1 is the probability that j wins at price pn.
We know some types of i buy at price pn−ℓ, without loss of generality, for t ≥ 1, let
pn−ℓ−t be the price before pn−ℓ at which some types of i buy in equilibrium. We have
π
j
n−ℓ =
2F(vin−ℓ)
F(vin−ℓ) + F(v
i
n−ℓ−t)
and
π̂
j
n−1 =
F(vin−1)
F(vin−ℓ)
Note that if there are no types of i who buy at pn−1, then F(v
i
n−1) = F(v
i
n−ℓ), and
π̂
j
n−1 = 1. Otherwise π̂
j
n−1 is less than 1.
Finally
φ
j
n−1 =
1
2
+
1
2
F(vin)
F(vin−1)
(A.4)
where, again, if there are no types of i who buy at pn−1, then we have F(v
i
n−1) =
F(vin−ℓ).
From the above, we have
H
j
n−ℓ =
F(vin−1) + F(v
i
n)
F(vin−ℓ) + F(v
i
n−ℓ−t)
Now, we can rewrite equation (A.3) above as
v
j
n−ℓ − pn−ℓ =
(1− ε)(pn−ℓ − pn)H
j
n−ℓ
1− (1− ε)H
j
n−ℓ
(A.5)
Let
G
j
n−1(v) ≡ v− pn−1− (1− ε)(v − pn) H
j
n−1
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where H
j
n−1 = π
j
n−1 φ
j
n−1, where φ
j
n−1 is as above (given by equation (A.4)), and π
j
n−1
is the probability that the object is period n − 1 given that j refuses the current offer
of pn−1. Note that π
j
n−1 = 1 if no types of i buy at price pn−1, otherwise it is equal to
2F(vin−1)
F(vin−1)+F(v
i
n)
. In either case, since φ
j
n−1 < 1, we have H
j
n−1 < 1 as well. To establish
that contrary to what has been supposed, there are types of j who, not having bought
before, will in fact want to buy at price pn−1, it is useful to break up the analysis into
several cases.
Case 1: ℓ and t are fixed positive integers.
Intuitively, this is the case where both i and j follow strategies where they do not buy
for some finite number of prices. Note that in this case, as δ → 0, the real length of the
interval over which they don’t buy converge to zero. More specifically, δ(ℓ+ t− 1) →
0, as δ → 0. The fact that vin−ℓ−t − v
i
n−1 < δ(ℓ+ t− 1), (shown below in Lemma (6)), is
used for proving this case.
Now, since there are no types of j who buy at pn−1, it must be that G
j
n−1(v) is not
strictly positive for any v ∈ [pn−1, v
j
n−ℓ]. Consider the value of G
j
n−1(·) at v
j
n−ℓ. We
have
G
j
n−1(v
j
n−ℓ) = v
j
n−ℓ − pn−1− (1− ε)(v
j
n−ℓ − pn) H
j
n−1
= (v
j
n−ℓ − pn−ℓ) + (pn−ℓ − pn)− ∆n−1
− (1− ε)
[
(v
j
n−ℓ − pn−ℓ) + (pn−ℓ − pn)
]
H
j
n−1
= (pn−ℓ − pn)
(
1− (1− ε) H
j
n−1
1− (1− ε) H
j
n−ℓ
)
− ∆n−1
>
[
2
(
1− (1− ε) H
j
n−1
1− (1− ε) H
j
n−ℓ
)
− 1
]
∆n−1
where the second step follows from equation (A.5), and the third step follows from the
fact that pn−ℓ − pn > pn−2 − pn = ∆n−2 + ∆n−1 > 2∆n−1.
Now, since
H
j
n−ℓ =
F(vin−1) + F(v
i
n)
F(vin−ℓ) + F(v
i
n−ℓ−t)
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and
H
j
n−1 =

F(vin−1) + F(v
i
n)
F(vin−1) + F(v
i
n−ℓ)
if some types of i buy at pn−1
F(vin−ℓ) + F(v
i
n)
2F(vin−ℓ)
otherwise
we have,
H
j
n−1
H
j
n−ℓ
=

F(vin−ℓ) + F(v
i
n−ℓ−t)
F(vin−ℓ) + F(v
i
n−1)
if some types of i buy at pn−1
F(vin−ℓ) + F(v
i
n−ℓ−t)
2F(vin−ℓ)
otherwise
From Lemma 6, vin−ℓ−t − v
i
n−1 < δ(ℓ + t − 1). Therefore, as δ → 0, the ratio
H
j
n−1
H
j
n−ℓ
converges to 1. Hence for sufficiently small δ, the term
1−(1−ε) H
j
n−1
1−(1−ε) H
j
n−ℓ
is greater than 12
and we have G
j
n−1(v
j
n−ℓ) > 0.
Case 2: t is arbitrary and ℓ varies with n.
This is the case when the gap pn−ℓ − pn−1 does not vanish as δ→ 0.
Consider again G
j
n−1(v
j
n−ℓ).
From equation (A.5),
v
j
n−ℓ − pn−ℓ =
(1− ε)(pn−ℓ − pn)H
j
n−ℓ
1− (1− ε)H
j
n−ℓ
As δ → 0, since (pn−ℓ − pn) does not vanish, and since for any given η > 0, H
j
n−ℓ is
bounded away from zero, v
j
n−ℓ − pn−ℓ does not vanish. Therefore, v
j
n−ℓ − pn−1 does
not vanish. However, pn − pn−1 → 0, and (1 − ε)H
j
n−1 < 1. Therefore for δ small
enough, G
j
n−1(v
j
n−ℓ) > 0.
In the two cases above, we have shown that G
j
n−1(v
j
n−ℓ) > 0. But since G
j
k(·) is strictly
increasing, continuous, and negative at pn−1, G
j
n−1(v
j
n−ℓ) > 0 implies that there is
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v
j
n−1 ∈ (pn−1, v
j
n−ℓ) such that G
j
n−1(v) > 0 for v ∈ (v
j
n−1, v
j
n−ℓ). Since types below v
j
n−ℓ
do not buy at any price greater than or equal to pn−ℓ, these types (of positive measure)
strictly prefer to stop at pn−1 rather than wait till pn. This contradicts the supposition
that there are no types of j who buy at pn−1.
We need to consider a third possibility in order to complete the Lemma.
Case 3: ℓ is a fixed integer and t varies with n.
This is the case when as δ → 0, δ(ℓ+ t− 1) does not go to zero because t (and n) become
arbitrarily large as δ becomes small. However, this is analogous to the cases we have
analyzed before with i and j roles being switched. We know that in equilibrium, both
buyers have types who plan to buy at price pn−ℓ. If i plans to buy at prices pn−ℓ−t and
pn−ℓ, but does not plan to buy at prices {pn−ℓ−t+1, ..., pn−ℓ−1} then the best response of
j should include not to plan to buy at prices {pn−ℓ−t+1, ..., pn−ℓ−2}.If pn−ℓ−t− pn−ℓ−1
does not go to zero, then we can use the arguments of case 2 above to argue that con-
trary to what is being supposed, for small δ, buyer i will in fact have some types of
positive measure who will want to buy at pn−ℓ−1 rather than waiting till pn−ℓ.
This completes the proof of the lemma.‖
To continue nowwith the proof of the Proposition, suppose both buyers have a positive
measure of types buying at prices pn−k to pn, where 1 6 k 6 n− 2. By exactly the same
argument as above we can establish that both buyers must also buy at pk−1. This,
combined with the previous steps complete the proof of proposition 1.‖
Finally we show in Lemma 6 below the fact we have used in case 1, namely that
vin−ℓ−t − v
i
n−1 < δ(ℓ+ t− 1).
Lemma 6 vin−ℓ−t − v
i
n−1 < δ(ℓ+ t− 1).
Proof: vin−ℓ−t is given by G
i
n−ℓ−t(v) = 0, i.e.
vin−ℓ−t − pn−ℓ−t = (1− ε)(v
i
n−ℓ−t − pn−ℓ)H
i
n−ℓ−t
= (1− ε)(vin−ℓ−t − pn−ℓ−t + ∆n−ℓ−t + . . .+ ∆n−ℓ−1)H
i
n−ℓ−t
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Solving,
vin−ℓ−t − pn−ℓ−t = (∆n−ℓ−t + . . .+ ∆n−ℓ−1)
(1− ε)Hin−ℓ−1
1− (1− ε)Hin−ℓ−1
< (∆n−ℓ−t + . . .+ ∆n−ℓ−1)
(1− ε)
ε
(A.6)
Let α ≡ 1−δ1−δ+δε . From equation (3.2), we have ∆k = δǫα
k. Therefore
vin−ℓ−t − pn−1 = v
i
n−ℓ−t − pn−ℓ−t + pn−ℓ−t − pn−1
= vin−ℓ−t − pn−ℓ−t + ∆n−ℓ−t + . . .+ ∆n−2
< (∆n−ℓ−t + . . .+ ∆n−ℓ−1)
(1− ε)
ε
+ ∆n−ℓ−1 + ∆n−ℓ + . . .+ ∆n−2
= (∆n−ℓ−t + . . .+ ∆n−ℓ−2)
(1− ε)
ε
+
∆n−ℓ−1
ε
+ ∆n−ℓ + . . .+ ∆n−2
= δ(1− ε)
[
αn−ℓ−t + . . .+ αn−ℓ−2
]
δ + δε
[
αn−ℓ + . . .+ αn−2
]
< δ(1− ε)(t − 1) + δ+ δε(ℓ− 1)
< δ(ℓ+ t− 1)
where the third step follows from the inequality (A.6) above, and the fifth and the last
step follow, respectively, from the facts that α < 1 and ε < 1.
Finally, since vin−1 > pn−1, v
i
n−ℓ−1 − v
i
n−1 < v
i
n−ℓ−1 − pn−1 < δ(ℓ+ t − 1). This com-
pletes the proof.‖
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
To show that a symmetric equilibrium exists, we need to show first that the set of cut-
off vectors ≡ {v0, v1, . . . , vn} (denoted by E) is convex and compact, set up a best
response mapping from E to E, and establish that the mapping is continuous. Once
this is done, Brouwer’s fixed point theorem tells us that the mapping has a fixed point,
which is therefore a symmetric equilibrium.
As the formal proof shows, this can be done easily except that a trick is required to
establish a continuous mapping from E to E. Below we first explain informally what
the problem is and how the “trick” that solves the problem works. The formal proof is
then presented in section A.3.2.
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A.3.1 Informal Exposition
To clarify the idea of the proof, consider an example with n = 3. Since we already
know v0 ≡ 1 and v3 = p3, let us first describe the set of the rest of the cut-offs. The
figure below illustrates the set D of cut-offs (v1, v2). The shaded area in figure 3 below
shows the set D.
0
1
1
A
D ≡ A ∩ C 
C
p
p
1
2
Figure 3: Any (v1, v2) is in the unit square and must satisfy v1 > p1 and v2 > p2 and v1 > v2.
The upper right hand rectangle A is the set of numbers (x1, x2) in the unit square satisfying
x1 > p1 and x2 > p2. The set of cut-offs D is the intersection of this set and the lower triangle
C which is the set of numbers (x1, x2) in the unit square with x1 > x2.
Now, for this example, let E ≡
{
v ∈ [0, 1]4 |v0 = 1, {v1, v2} ∈ D, v3 = p3
}
. This is the
set of cut-off vectors ≡ (v0, v1, v2, v3). Note that this set is compact and convex. In the
proof the set E is constructed in a similar way for arbitrary n : first we define the set D
⊂ [0, 1]n−1 and then E is constructed by adding the numbers 1 and pn at the beginning
and the end respectively to get a set in [0, 1]n+1.
Next we need to establish a best response mapping from E to E.
We say that any cut-off vector v is in the interior of E if (v1, ...vn−1) is in the interior
of D. (For the example, v is in the interior if (v1, v2) is in the interior of the region
D shown above.) Now for any such v, we can show that the best response to v is
continuous; moreover, when δ is small (i.e. n is large), the best response is in the
interior of E as well. The intuition for this result is similar to that for Proposition 2.
Suppose a positive measure of types of j buy at each price (i.e. the cutoff vector of j is
in the interior of E). Now at any price pk, suppose the seller asks buyer i whether he
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wants to buy. By accepting, type v of i gets a certain payoff of v− pk, while waiting till
pk+1 involves facing ambiguity, and therefore the payoff is (1− ε)(v − pk+1)H
i
k where
Hik is the probability of being offered pk+1 conditional on rejecting pk. It follows from
Proposition 2 that when the difference between prices is small (i.e. δ small), there are
types of i who find it optimal to buy at pk rather than wait.
Therefore, for small δ, the interior of E maps to the interior of E in a continuous manner.
However, the same is not true for boundary points. In the example above, suppose that
the strategy of a buyer (say j) is that “all types buy only at p3.” Since no type of j buys
either at p1 or at p2, we have v0 = v1 = v2 = 1. Such a cut-off vector is clearly not
in the interior of E (in figure 3 the corresponding (v1, v2) is the point (1, 1)). For such
“border points” the best response by i clearly does not involve buying at p1.
But as Proposition 2 shows (and aswe have argued in the preceding paragraphs), when
δ is small, for any v in the interior of E, the best response is in the interior of E as well.
This therefore creates a discontinuity in the best response when δ is small.
To be specific, consider a sequence of vectors v that converge to some point in the
boundary (e.g. the point (1, 1) in the example). For every point along the sequence,
the best response involves a measure of types buying at all prices, where the measure
is uniformly bounded away from zero.(37) But at a boundary point the best response
does involve not buying at some prices so the measure of types buying at some prices
drops discontinuously to zero.(38)
Given this discontinuity, Brouwer’s theorem cannot be used to show existence. How-
ever, there is an easy solution to this problem.
Now from Proposition 2, for any v in the interior of E, the k-th element of the best
response cut-off vector (denoted by yk(v)) is given by
yk(v) = pk + ∆k
(1− ε)Hk(v)
1− (1− ε)Hk(v)
Consider any cut-off vector v˜ on the border of E at which the best response function
is discontinuous (say the best response is to not buy at price pk). We then replace this
with a “pseudo best response” function which is a continuous extension of the best
(37)As long as some types of the other buyer buys at some price, while calculating the expected benefit
and expected cost from waiting, a buyer puts at least ε weight on the worst outcome.
(38)See Nishimura and Ozaki (2004) for a different kind of fix to the similar problem that the Choquet
capacity resulting from epsilon contamination preferences is discontinuous.
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response function from the interior of E to the relevant border point of E. Specifically,
let ŷk(v˜) be such that
ŷk(v˜) = pk + ∆k
(1− ε)
ε
Clearly, limv→v˜ yk(v) = ŷk(v˜). Thus replacing y by ŷ at the discontinuity points pre-
serves continuity of the best response mapping.
With this in mind, suppose we propose the following “pseudo best response” function
Ψ : E → E. For any strategy with a cut-off vector in the interior in E, the function Ψ
coincides with the actual best response function. However, for any point on the border
of E at which the actual best response function is discontinuous, the function coincides
with the pseudo best response function.
The function Ψ is constructed to be continuous, and therefore by Brouwer’s theorem it
has a fixed point. Since the best response to any v in the interior of E is in the interior
of E and away from the boundary, Ψ maps any boundary point to the interior as well.
Since Ψ(v) is in the interior of E for all v ∈ E, the fixed point must be in the interior of
E. But Ψ is the true best response function for any v in the interior of E, and therefore
the fixed point result establishes the existence of a symmetric equilibrium.
A.3.2 Formal Proof
Define Ak = [pk, 1] for k = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1. Let A be the cartesian product of A
k. A vector
x ∈ A is of the form: x = {x1, . . . , xn−1}, such that xk ∈ [pk, 1]. Note that A is closed
and bounded and hence compact; it is also convex.
Let B be the cartesian product of [0, 1] taken n− 1 times. Let C be the subset of B such
that
C =
{
x ∈ [0, 1]n−1 |x1 ≥ x2 ≥ . . . ≥ xn−1
}
C is closed and bounded and hence compact. It is also convex.(39) Let D be the in-
tersection of C and A; that is D ≡ C ∩ A. Since C and A are both finite dimensional
compact convex sets, D is also compact and convex. Finally, we can define the set of
cut-off vectors E:
E =
{
v ∈ [0, 1]n+1 |v0 = 1, {v1, . . . , vn−1} ∈ D, vn = pn
}
(39)If xk ≥ xk+1 and yk ≥ yk+1, then clearly λxk + (1− λ)yk ≥ λxk−1 + (1− λ)yk−1 for λ ∈ (0, 1).
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That is E is the set of cut-off vectors D with each vector augmented by an initial and
final element, which are fixed at 1 and pn, respectively.
Throughout the proof we assume that δ is small enough so that all previous results
hold.
The following definitions are used throughout the proof.
Any vector (v1, . . . , vn−1) is said to be in the interior of D if vk > vk+1 for all k ∈
{1, . . . , n − 2}, and any vector in D not in the interior of D is said to be in the border
of D. Any vector is said to be in the interior (border) of E if (v1, . . . , vn−1) is in the
interior (border) of D.
Next, similar to the term Hik in lemma 1 (as well as in appendix A.1), let Hk(v) denote
the probability that the a buyer can buy at pk+1 conditional on passing at pk. As before,
this is given by Hk(v) =
F(vk) + F(vk+1)
F(vk) + F(vk−1)
.
Now, consider any ∈ E with at least three elements coinciding, i.e. vk−1 = vk = vk+1
for some k (figure 1 in section 3.4 provides an example). This implies that the buyer
associated with does not bid at pk and pk+1, and therefore Hk(v) = 1. This in turn
implies that the best response by i involves not buying at pk.
Let EB denote the set of such vectors, i.e.
EB ≡ {v ∈ E|vk−1 = vk = vk+1for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}}
Let EI ≡ E\EB.
Note that EB is a subset of the border of E. In the example in the previous section with
n = 3, EB is the singleton (1, 1, 1, p3), and the corresponding point in the set D in fig-
ure 3 is the corner point (1, 1). EI then contains the interior of E as well as those border
vectors that have the property that for any k, at most two successive components are
equal.
Let y(v) ≡ {y0(v), . . . , yn(v)} denote the best response to any v ∈ E.
STEP 1: First, consider the set of vectors in EI .
We know that y0(v) = 1 and yn(v) = pn. From Proposition 2, for any v in the interior
of E, yk(v) is well defined, unique, and continuous in v for any k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}.
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From Proposition 2, we also know that the best response is given by
yk(v) = pk + ∆k
(1− ε)Hk(v)
1− (1− ε)Hk(v)
(A.7)
Finally, consider vectors v˜ ∈ EI that do not belong to the interior of E. As noted before,
these are vectors in the border of E such that if vk−1 = vk for any k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then
vk−2 > vk−1 whenever k − 2 > 0, and vk > vk+1 whenever k + 1 6 n. In other words,
these are vectors such that at any k at most two successive components coincide.
Suppose vk−1 = vk. Then, as shown in appendix A.1, φk−1 = 1, and Hk−1 = πk−1
where πk−1 =
2F(vk−1)
F(vk−2)+F(vk−1)
< 1. Further, πk = 1, and Hk = φk where φk = 1/2 +
1/2
F(vk)
F(vk+1)
< 1.
Now, let v˜ be any vector in EI not in the interior of E. It follows from Proposition 2 that
yk−1(v˜) = pk + ∆k
(1− ε)φk−1
1− (1− ε)φk−1
yk(v˜) = pk + ∆k
(1− ε)πk
1− (1− ε)πk
But for any such v˜ it is also true that limv→v˜ Hk−1 = φk−1 and limv→v˜ Hk = πk. It
follows that limv→v˜ yk−1(v) = yk−1(v˜) and limv→v˜ yk(v) = yk(v˜).
This proves that y(v) is continuous at any v ∈ EI .
STEP 2: Next consider v ∈ EB. For any such vector, there is some k for which Hk = 1.
Note that for any ∈ EI , Hk < 1. The argument in step 1 shows that for any Hk < 1,
yk < yk−1. This also implies that limHk→1 yk < yk−1 But if Hk = 1, yk = yk−1. Thus the
best response mapping is discontinuous at any v ∈ EB.
To solve the problem we proceed as follows. For any ∈ EB we let ŷk(v) be a “pseudo
best response” where
ŷk(v) = pk + ∆k
(1− ε)
ε
Consider any v˜ ∈ EB. From equation (A.7), clearly limv→v˜ yk(v) = ŷk(v˜). Thus replac-
ing y by ŷ on EB preserves continuity of the best response mapping.
With this specification, the calculations in Proposition 2 can be retraced and it can be
easily seen that all conclusions are exactly the same (we are simply putting Hk = 1
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but preserving the factor (1− ε), and none of the results require Hk < 1). In particular,
note that ŷk < ŷk−1 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and therefore the pseudo best response vector
belongs in the interior of E.
STEP 3: Finally, define the mapping Ψ : E → E such that
Ψ0(v) = 1
Ψk(v) =
yk(v) if v ∈ EIŷk(v) if v ∈ EB
Ψn(v) = pn
Since Ψ maps E continuously to itself, by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, there exists a
fixed point of Ψ, i.e. there exists v∗ such that Ψ(v∗) = v∗.
We know from Proposition 2 that for any v ∈ EI , Ψ(v) belongs to the interior of E.
As noted at the end of step 2, the same is true for vectors in EB. Thus the range of Ψ
is a subset of the interior of E. Therefore any fixed point must be in the interior of E.
It follows that any fixed point must be a true mutual best response, and therefore a
symmetric equilibrium.
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